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The Next Frontier in Drone Law: Liability for
Cybersecurity Negligence and Data Breaches for
UAS Operators
JOSEPH J. VACEK*
ABSTRACT
While questions related to UAS operations and use in government
surveillance have been discussed at length, the legal ramifications of
cybersecurity negligence and data breaches for UAS operators have yet to
be addressed. In Part I, this article seeks to explore those areas by
discussing the UAS data chain. Vulnerabilities in this data chain specific
to UAS and in general are explored, followed by an examination of the
state of the law related to the collection, use, retention, and dissemination
of data. Part I concludes with an overview of current voluntary “Best
Practice” documents offering guidance for collecting and managing data.
Part II of this article applies Article III standing requirements and
third-party liability limitations to the cybersecurity negligence and data
breach issues. Existing federal law does not address liability for
cybersecurity negligence or data breaches in UAS operations. This,
combined with current interpretations of Article III standing requirements
and a lack of a required standard of care for UAS operators to protect
against cyber attack by third parties, results in the lack of a legal remedy
for people whose private data is captured by drone and later compromised
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aviation law, space law, and aviation technical and policy classes at the undergraduate,
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field of aviation law, including remote sensing, constitutional law related to search and
seizure, privacy and data security, and civil issues such as tort and insurance law. He holds
commercial pilot and certified flight instructor certificates and is a practicing lawyer, a
former Peace Corps volunteer, and an entrepreneur. He is the faculty advisor for the UND
competition aerobatic flying team. The author thanks the Campbell Law Review for
excellent assistance and professionalism throughout the editing process for this Article.
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and scholarly work in the editing process. It has been truly an honor to engage in thought
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in a cybersecurity breach. Thus, it appears UAS operators are effectively
shielded from liability for data breaches beyond the UAS operation and in
flight data collection.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last five years, Unmanned Aircraft System (“UAS”) use by
amateurs, journalists, businesses, and governmental actors has increased
exponentially.1 Their activities have resulted in the production of very
large quantities of private or sensitive imagery and an uncountable
accumulation of data related to such imagery.2 Specifically, imagery from
1. The capabilities of UAS as cheap, efficient platforms upon which various remote
sensing equipment can be mounted has led to the exponential increase in use. See Craigi,
The Drone Report 2016, DRONE FLYERS (Aug. 21, 2015), http://www.droneflyers.com/
2015/08/the-drone-report-2016/ [https://perma.cc/6FUD-8K9Z].
2. See Craigi, Best Selling Camera Drones on Amazon – December 2016, DRONE
FLYERS (Dec. 1, 2016), http://www.droneflyers.com/2016/12/best-selling-camera-dronesamazon-december-2016/ [https://perma.cc/ZB8F-7STE] (estimating that DJI, which holds
approximately 75% of the market share in consumer drones, will see sales of its drones top
1.5 million units in 2016-2017); Leo Sun, Should Xiaomi be Worth More than DJI
Innovations?, MOTLEY FOOL (Jul. 12, 2016), http://www.fool.com/investing/2016/07/12/
should-xiaomi-be-worth-more-than-dji-innovations.aspx
[https://perma.cc/4RV5-J3DP]
(calling DJI Innovations the “biggest drone maker in the world,” estimating its market value
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UAS platforms can include images or video in startlingly high-definition,
offering a valuable perspective to enthusiasts, businesses, and government
agencies.3 For example, UAS imagery has been used by animal rights
organizations to monitor hunters,4 by the film industry to capture new
perspectives,5 and by law enforcement operations to apprehend criminal
suspects.6 Along with imagery, associated data—such as GPS coordinates
of the imagery, or network traffic—can be gathered through UAS use.7
Such activities were rather limited until late 2016. Prior to August 29,
2016, drone operators needed either a “certificate of authorization”8 or an
exemption9 from regular flight regulations to fly legally and avoid civil and
criminal penalties. This changed on August 29, 2016, when Federal
at $8 billion, and further noting that DJI employs some 5,000 people worldwide and
reported 2014 gross revenues of $500 million).
3. See, e.g., Lindsey T. Anderson, Note, The Sky’s the Limit: UAS Regulations and
Changing Applications in Agriculture, 8 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC. & NAT’L RESOURCE L. 401,
405–06 (2015-2016) (discussing current uses of UAS, including “law enforcement,
firefighting, border patrol, disaster relief, search and rescue, and military training[,]” by BP
to monitor an oil pipeline in Alaska, and by film production firms in Hollywood for aerial
shots on movie sets). See also id. at 410–12 (discussing the future application of UAS
technology in precision agriculture, including monitoring fields for overwatering, pesticide
overuse or deficiency, as well as instant assessment of crop damage following heavy rains in
flooded fields); GLENNON J. HARRISON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. R42938, UNMANNED
AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS): MANUFACTURING TRENDS 5 tbl.1 (2013), https://fas.org/
sgp/crs/natsec/R42938.pdf [https://perma.cc/UH45-3BS2] (listing twenty nonmilitary
applications for UAS, including traffic monitoring, damage assessment, aerial photography,
and sporting events coverage).
4. Alisa Mullins, Hunters Watch Out: PETA’s Drones Are Flying, PETA (Oct. 21,
2013), http://www.peta.org/blog/hunters-watch-out-petas-drones-are-flying/ [https://perma
.cc/7DK9-JPCC].
5. See AERIAL MOB, http://aerialmob.com/ [https://perma.cc/3JYG-S6XU].
6. Jennifer Lynch, FAA Releases Lists of Drone Certificates—Many Questions Left
Unanswered, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 19, 2012), https://www.eff.org/
deeplinks/2012/04/faa-releases-its-list-drone-certificates-leaves-many-questionsunanswered [https://perma.cc/P5ZZ-WTXC].
7. Andy Greenberg, Flying Drone Can Crack Wi-Fi Networks, Snoop on Cell Phones,
FORBES (July 28, 2011, 2:11 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2011/07/28/
flying-drone-can-crack-wifi-networks-snoop-on-cell-phones/#1a6ff8a066f9 [https://perma.
cc/UX43-HPH5] (discussing drones’ potential for cell phone and wifi hacking).
8. Certificates of Waiver or Authorization (COA), FED. AVIATION ADMIN.,
https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ato/service_units/systemops/
aaim/organizations/uas/coa/ [https://perma.cc/YK99-WNMK] (last modified Aug. 19, 2016,
8:21 PM).
9. See Section 333, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., http://www.faa.gov/uas/beyond_the_
basics/section_333/ [https://perma.cc/QAR6-JK2Q] (last modified Sept. 23, 2016, 9:46 AM)
(explaining the exemption process set forth in Section 333 of the FAA Modernization and
Reform Act of 2012).
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Aviation Regulation part 107 went into effect.10 A step towards integration
of UAS into the National Airspace, part 107 created a straightforward
licensure and regulatory structure allowing for commercial use of small
unmanned aircraft.11 The Association of Unmanned Vehicle Systems
International, a trade group for the larger unmanned vehicle and robotics
industry, predicts that in the first three years of integration more than
70,000 jobs will be created in the United States with an economic impact of
more than $13.6 billion.12 By 2025 an estimated 100,000 jobs, or more,
will be created and integration will have an economic impact of $82
billion.13 Most of that value will be tied directly to the data gathered by
UAS operations.14 However, along with the production of great value
comes the production of very large quantities of sensitive imagery, data,
and private information, much the same way Big Data companies such as
Google or Facebook have created great value by aggregating large amounts
of private data.15 The issues related to the Big Data phenomenon have been

10. 14 C.F.R. § 107 (2016).
11. The regulations apply to the operation of “civil small unmanned aircraft systems
within the United States.” 14 C.F.R. § 107.1(a). Small unmanned aircraft systems are
defined as those weighing less than 55 pounds at takeoff. Id. § 107.3. Several restrictions
apply to the operation of authorized small UAS: they must be operated at altitudes of less
than 400 feet, with limited exceptions, id. § 107.51(b); the operator must be in visual line of
sight with the small UAS at all times, id. § 107.31(a); they may only be operated during
daylight hours, id. § 107.29, away from clouds, id. § 107.51(d), and away from other
aircraft, id. § 107.37. Further, the operator may not operate the small UAS in any controlled
airspace, id. § 107.41, near any airport, id. § 107.43, or over any group of people, id.
§ 107.39.
12. DARRYL JENKINS & BIJAH VASIGH, ASS’N FOR UNMANNED VEHICLE SYS. INT’L, THE
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS INTEGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 2
(2013), http://www.auvsi.org/auvsiresources/economicreport [https://perma.cc/7WKUFQJA].
13. Id.
14. See id.; U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM (UAS) SERVICE
DEMAND 2015–2035: LITERATURE REVIEW AND PROJECTIONS OF FUTURE USAGE 94 (2013),
https://fas.org/irp/program/collect/service.pdf [https://perma.cc/3E88-FJWB] (“While most
of the UAS industry is focused on a derivative of current military uses for security and
police operations, the civil industry is looking to use the UAS as a platform to produce
revenue from the data derived through the sensors.”).
15. See id.; Margaret Hu, Small Data Surveillance v. Big Data Cybersurveillance, 42
PEPP. L. REV. 773, 824 tbl.3 (2015) (describing Google’s cache of consumer web-browsing
history data as more than 100 petabytes in size, while Facebook has amassed more than 300
petabytes of user data among posts, comments, and uploaded photos, and YouTube contains
more than 1,000 petabytes of user-uploaded video content). See also Brian McKenna, What
(Mar.
2013),
does
a
petabyte
look
like?,
COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM
http://www.computerweekly.com/feature/What-does-a-petabyte-look-like [https://perma.cc/
WL4X-HKFY] (describing one petabyte, or one thousand terabytes, as four times the
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explored at some length and overlap significantly with the issues raised by
UAS use for data gathering.16 The key difference, however, is the length of
the data chain and the consequent attenuation of potential liability for data
breaches or negligence. This Article will explore, at length, this data chain
and the limitations on liability. For purposes of this Article, the data
chain17 contains four links: (1) drone operation itself, (2) in-flight data
collection, (3) post-flight data processing, and (4) data use, dissemination,
and storage. Liability for data breaches in the last two links is well
settled.18 On the other hand, liability for data breaches in the first two
links—drone operation and in-flight data collection—is unsettled, and the
consequences of a breach there is likely different than in the latter two
links. Thus, this Article explores liability for UAS operators and general
data liability for post-flight activities.19
I. UAS USE FOR DATA GATHERING: LARGE QUANTITIES OF
POTENTIALLY SENSITIVE IMAGERY, DATA, AND PRIVATE INFORMATION
Currently, a commercial UAS operator can gather imagery data and
sell it largely without regulation.20 A hypothetical example of such an
activity follows: A real estate agency hires a UAS company to capture
aerial imagery and video for use on the agency’s website.
The UAS company uses a commercially available off-the-shelf
quad-rotor drone system equipped with a stabilized high-definition
camera.21 Such a system is capable of about 15 to 30 minutes of sustained

amount of data collected by the U.S. Library of Congress from its inception until 2011, or
“enough to store the DNA of the entire population of the US – and then clone them,
twice.”).
16. E.g., Hu, supra note 15.
17. For purposes of this Article, I have organized UAS operations into a “chain” that
begins with operating the drone and ends with uploading any data gathered in-flight to a
personal computer, server, or other network-enabled device, in order to examine various
vulnerabilities at each stage of the process.
18. See infra Part II.
19. An authorized small UAS operator is a person with a remote pilot certificate with a
small UAS rating or a person manipulating the flight controls of the small UAS under the
direct supervision of one so certified. 14 C.F.R. § 107.12(a) (2016).
20. Joseph J. Vacek, Remote Sensing of Private Data by Drones is Mostly Unregulated:
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy Are At Risk Absent Comprehensive Federal
Legislation, 90 N.D. L. REV. 463, 466 (2016).
21. This hypothetical example is based on the use of a DJI Phantom 4 drone, which is
equipped with a 12 Megapixel camera and capable of recording 4k video (3840x2160) at up
to 30 frames per second. See Phantom 4 Specs, DJI http://www.dji.com/phantom4/info#specs [https://perma.cc/EGJ2-2AVQ] (last visited Dec. 17, 2016).
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flight, which includes hovering, at altitudes of up to several thousand feet.22
The electrically powered drone is both extremely agile and stable due to its
gyroscopic autopilot.23 The imagery gathered by its camera can be stored
on-board or streamed live back down to the operator or another receiver
and includes both high-definition video and still images.24 The camera is
fully gimballed, meaning it can remain focused and zoom-in on a subject of
interest while the drone maneuvers.25 Naturally, this drone is capable of
trespassing onto private property, as its operator can fly it beyond the line
of sight or even into a structure, using the drone’s onboard GPS navigations
system plus cameras to provide the operator with perspective.26 The drone
platform also makes quick work of gathering a bird’s-eye view from
practically any altitude, with the operator a mile or two away.27
The UAS company would be required to comply with all applicable
flight-related regulations, such as altitude limitations,28 exclusion from
protected airspace,29 and weather restrictions.30 The real estate agency
would have contracted with the UAS company to purchase the data
gathered, including the intellectual property rights associated with the
imagery and video. To differentiate itself, the UAS company advertises
multi-spectral imagery,31 which allows the real estate agency to capture a
near-infrared thermal image, overlay it upon a visual image, and add the

22. Id. (the DJI Phantom 4 has a service ceiling of 19,685 feet above sea level).
23. Id. (the DJI Phantom 4 can travel at speeds up to 20 meters per second, or
approximately 44 miles per hour, and can hover automatically at a fixed point for filming,
with vertical and horizontal deviations at 0.1 and 0.3 meters, respectively).
24. Id. (the operator can view a “drones-eye” view on the ground in 720p video
(1280x720) at 30 frames per second). See also supra note 21.
25. Id. (while the drone is traveling forward, the camera can pan and rotate freely,
looking in any direction, from straight down to the ground to straight out to the horizon, and
anywhere in between).
26. Id. See also supra note 24.
27. Id. (the remote control device can transmit and receive signals from the drone from
up to 2.2 miles away).
28. 14 C.F.R. § 107.51(b) (2016).
29. Id. § 107.41.
30. Id. § 107.51(c).
31. See, e.g., Taking Flight: Small Business Utilization of Unmanned Aircraft: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 114th Cong. 31 (2015) (statement of Michael J. Gilkey,
CEO, 3D Aerial Solutions, LLC) (“The images record reflected sunlight at different
wavelengths, or ‘colors’. Different cameras are used to collect in different spectral bands
(i.e. visible, near infrared and thermal infrared) to provide a variety of techniques for
analysis. Multispectral cameras efficiently collect multiple colors simultaneously.”).
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result to the advertisement showing the house’s energy efficiency level as a
selling point.32
During the flight, the UAS company used near-infrared thermal
imagery33 and inadvertently captured high-definition imagery and video of
a couple in the next yard sharing an intimate moment. The near-infrared
camera recorded the scene even though a sunshade hid the couple from
visual observation.34 Neither the UAS company nor the real estate agency
detected the error, and the agency later posted the images and video to its
website. Soon thereafter, several “prurient interest” sites reposted the
images. The couple was identified due to GPS location metadata
associated with the imagery, ultimately causing the couple embarrassment
and unwanted publicity.
Based on these hypothetical facts, a negligence lawsuit seems
appropriate. However, the existing laws regulating remote sensing
activities and data breaches suggest unexpected results in terms of liability
for UAS-sensed data. To explain, this Article now turns to vulnerabilities
in the data chain, followed by an exploration of the law related to the
collection, use, retention, and dissemination of data gathered by UAS.
Discussion turns next to limitations on liability for data breach and
negligence in UAS cybersecurity before ultimately concluding that UAS
operators are effectively insulated from liability for negligence in the data
chain beyond flight activity.
A. Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities Throughout the Data Chain
Cybersecurity vulnerabilities exist throughout the data chain for
UAS-sensed data.35 As stated above, the data chain includes four links: (1)
drone operation itself, (2) in-flight data collection, (3) post-flight data
processing, and (4) data use, dissemination, and storage. Vulnerabilities in
this data chain include sniffing, spoofing, snooping, and sabotage.36 These
32. See id. at 70 (July 14, 2015 Letter from Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors) (“REALTORS®
are excited about the potential to use UAS technology to take photographs and video
footage of property listings for residential, commercial, and land sales or leases.”).
33. See M. Annette Lanning, Note, Thermal Surveillance: Do Infrared Eyes in the Sky
Violate the Fourth Amendment?, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1771, 1773–74 (1995) (discussing
capabilities of forward-looking infrared (FLIR) imaging technology).
34. See id. at 1774 (“The FLIR can also detect body heat through a curtain or a thin
partition.” (citing State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 595 (Wash. 1994) (en banc))).
35. Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee—New Task, 80 Fed. Reg. 5880, 5880
(Feb. 3, 2015).
36. See infra Section I.A.2. See also Stephen E. Henderson & Matthew E. Yarbrough,
Suing the Insecure?: A Duty of Care in Cyberspace, 32 N.M. L. REV. 11 (2002) (discussing
negligence liability in the context of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks); Kristin

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2017

7

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 3

142

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:1

vulnerabilities can occur in isolation or combination and may occur during
flight operations or on the ground, with different ramifications for each
situation.
1.

Vulnerabilities Unique to UAS Operations

Each of the cybersecurity vulnerabilities may occur individually or in
combination in the first link in the data chain. For starters, UAS are not
entirely autonomous—all require some level of connection with the
operator, whether it is a simple radio link directly connecting the controller
with the aircraft flight controls37 or a sophisticated three-way connection
between the ground controller, the aircraft flight computer, and the GPS
navigation satellite system. 38 A malicious actor can cause a loss of control
by spoofing the controller or GPS signals with stronger, incorrect
“spoofed” signals.39 The malicious actor broadcasts false location data on
the same GPS frequencies, which are relatively weak, so the drone relies on
stronger false signals, resulting in position and navigation errors.40 Drones
that rely on GPS as part of their navigation or flight control systems are
vulnerable to a spoofing attack in flight.41 If the spoof is successful, the
Shields, Cybersecurity: Recognizing the Risk and Protecting Against Attacks, 19 N.C.
BANKING INST. 345, 349–51 (2015) (discussing vulnerabilities in financial institution
networks, including phishing, malware, and unauthorized access through unsecured
third-party vendors); Jared Magill, The Crooked Path to Determining Liability in Data
Breach Cases, WIRED, http://www.wired.com/insights/2015/03/crooked-path-determiningliability-data-breach-cases/ [https://perma.cc/88CE-KY5S] (discussing the history of
cybercrime laws in the U.S. and the failed passage of the Personal Data Protection and
Breach Accountability Act of 2014, S. 1995, 113th Cong. § 101 (2014), which would have
imposed criminal penalties on businesses entrusted with personally identifying consumer
data that intentionally failed to disclose breaches of that data).
37. See, e.g., John Patrick Pullen, This Is How Drones Work, TIME (Apr. 3, 2015),
http://time.com/3769831/this-is-how-drones-work/ [https://perma.cc/E3GM-V4XQ].
38. See, e.g., Alberto Cuadra & Craig Witlock, How Drones Are Controlled, THE
WASHINGTON POST (June 20, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/
national/drone-crashes/how-drones-work/ [https://perma.cc/G7QD-B7PQ].
39. See Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, Drone Hijacking? That’s Just the Start of GPS
Troubles, WIRED (July 6, 2012, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2012/07/dronehijacking/all/ [https://perma.cc/S6EV-SH66] (describing how, in a test conducted by
researchers from the University of Texas and organized by the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, the researchers successfully hijacked a civilian drone by “spoofing” it
with faulty GPS data).
40. See id. (explaining that GPS signals come from high altitude satellites which makes
them highly susceptible to intentional and unintentional interference).
41. See id. (“The drone, an Adaptive Flight Hornet Mini, was hovering at around 60
feet, locked into a predetermined position guided by GPS. Then, with a device that cost
around $1,000 and the help of sophisticated software that took four years to develop, the
researchers sent a radio signal from a hilltop one kilometer away. In security lingo, they
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UAS will follow the false signals and crash, resulting in a successful
sabotage.42 If a UAS operator experiences such a scenario, he would be
potentially liable in tort for damages caused by the crash.43
Also related to the drone operation link in the chain, malicious actors
might engage in packet sniffing. Packet sniffing is a software program or
hardware device used to intercept and log data traffic that passes through
it.44 Any data that passes through a network, whether wired or wireless,
can be vulnerable to a packet sniff, but not all packet sniffing is necessarily
malicious.45 However, malicious packet sniffing at the first link of drone
operation can provide the initial information needed to hack the drone later
or breach the data later in the data chain.46
The second link in the data chain, in-flight data collection, includes
the capture of imagery or data from the drone operation by the drone’s
operator or, in the case of larger drones that have two person crews, a
dedicated sensor systems operator. If the UAS operator in our hypothetical
was streaming data from the UAS down to the controller and the data was
unencrypted, it would be subject to sniffing and, potentially, snooping. A
well-known vulnerability at the collection point of the data chain is simply
not encrypting the data gathered.47 If the drone broadcasts data to a ground

carried out a spoofing attack. ‘We fooled the UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) into
thinking that it was rising straight up,’ says Todd Humphreys, assistant professor at the
Radionavigation Laboratory at the University of Texas.”).
42. See, e.g., id. (“Deceiving the drone’s GPS receiver, [the researchers] changed its
perceived coordinates. To compensate, the small copter dove straight down, thinking it was
returning to its programmed position. If not for a safety pilot intervening before the drone
hit the ground, it would have crashed.”). See also Brandon Bellows, Comment, Floating
Toward a Sky Near You: Unmanned Aircraft Systems and the Implications of the FAA
Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, 78 J. AIR L. & COM. 585, 608–09 (2013) (discussing
the vulnerabilities of UAS to GPS spoofing attacks).
43. See infra Section II.B.
44. See Mani Potnuru, Note, Limits of the Federal Wiretap Act’s Ability to Protect
Against Wi-Fi Sniffing, 111 MICH. L. REV. 89, 91–92, 91 n.9 (2012) (explaining “passive”
and “active” scanning for wireless signals and how those techniques are used by packet
sniffers); Vacek, supra note 20, at 473 & n.51 (discussing packet analyzer software).
45. In fact, most Internet and Intranet (closed system) traffic is subjected to
interception, mostly for network administration purposes of traffic management, security, or
system health purposes.
46. See Potnuru, supra note 44, at 91–92 (explaining how packet-sniffing technology
may be used to access sensitive information, which may then be used to facilitate other
crimes).
47. See, e.g., Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Unmanned Aerial Exposure: Civil Liability
Concerns Arising from Domestic Law Enforcement Employment of Unmanned Aerial
Systems, 85 N.D. L. REV. 623, 631 (2009) (“[U]nencrypted video feeds captured by UAV
optical sensors could be intercepted by private parties, who might seek to view the
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receiver, anyone listening on the correct frequency can easily receive the
data as well, much like public media broadcast over the airwaves. This is
what happened in 2009 when Iraqi militants used cheap, off-the-shelf
components to intercept video streamed from a U.S. Military Predator
operation.48
As discussed below, the existing regulations for UAS operations are
silent as to data captured. However, vulnerabilities begin at the moment of
capture and operators may expose themselves to liability for not protecting
potentially sensitive data.49 Potential liability is complex due to issues with
foreseeability, as discussed below, and a lack of applicable regulatory
structure.50
2.

General Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities

The third link in the data chain, post-flight data processing, opens the
data to a multitude of general cybersecurity vulnerabilities, starting with
packet sniffing on the ground. As previously discussed, packet sniffing is
used to intercept and log data traffic that passes through a network.51
Malicious packet sniffing can lead to the leak of sensitive data at this point
in the data chain as well.
Spoofing refers to an attack on the data security later in the data
chain.52 Spoofing attacks usually involve a malicious actor attempting to
downloaded video or other imagery that exposes the targets of a UAV’s sensor package to a
loss of privacy.”).
48. Siobhan Gorman, Yochi J. Dreazen & August Cole, Insurgents Hack U.S. Drones,
THE WALL ST. J. (Dec. 17, 2009, 11:59 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles
/SB126102247889095011 [https://perma.cc/8RKJ-HKW7]; see also David Axe, Iran
Probably Did Capture a Secret U.S. Drone, WIRED (Dec. 6, 2011), https://www.wired.com
/2011/12/iran-did-capture-a-secret-u-s-drone/ [https://perma.cc/GDD7-JKR2] (discussing
the reported Iranian recovery of a U.S. RQ-170 spy drone that crashed near the IranAfghanistan border, and speculating that Iran may have downed the drone by use of a signal
jammer).
49. See discussion infra Part II.
50. See infra Section II.B.
51. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
52. Spoofing refers to any cyber attack that uses, as a method, the substitution of false
and malicious code or signals in place of the authentic code or signals with the intent that
the victim remain unaware of the substitution. See also Kelly A. Gable, Cyber-Apocalypse
Now: Securing the Internet Against Cyberterrorism and Using Universal Jurisdiction as a
Deterrent, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 57, 77 n.89 (2010) (“Spoofing is defined as the
‘appropriation of an authentic user’s identity by non-authentic users, causing fraud or
attempted fraud, in some cases, and causing critical infrastructure breakdowns in other
cases. Spoofing can also target nonuserbased entities. For instance, an IP address can be
spoofed to appropriate the identity of a server and not a human (user).’” (quoting
BERNADETTE SCHELL & CLEMENS MARTIN, WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD HACKER DICTIONARY
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access secure data by masquerading as a legitimate user.53 They may do so
either as an automated “man-in-the-middle” that inserts malicious code into
a computer that is used later to disable or snoop, or as a “human spoof,”
where a person impersonates another who has legitimate access in order to
obtain insider credentials and access a secure system.54 The human
“insider threat” is very difficult to protect against, since humans tend to
trust other humans.55
Snooping is a sometimes sophisticated56 method57 of gathering and
aggregating large quantities of user data.58 While the term may refer to
289 (2006))). Compare supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text (describing spoofing of a
nonuserbased entity earlier in the data chain, where the “victim” of the spoofed data is the
drone itself, which mistakes malicious signals for genuine signals), with infra note 53
(describing spoofing attacks later in the data chain, where the victim is a human user who
mistakes malicious code for the genuine article).
53. Douglas P. Whitlock, Internet Fraud: Preventing and Responding to Phishing and
Spoofing Scams, 49 N.H. B.J. 30, 30 (2008) (“A spoof website uses the logos, content, and
general design of the legitimate institution it is impersonating in order to trick the visitor
into believing that he or she has linked to the legitimate website.”).
54. See Shields, supra note 36, at 349–51, 350 (discussing third-party vulnerability and
the Target data breach, where “cybercriminals accessed Target’s computer system through
the security system of a heating and cooling contractor who was working for Target.”
Because Target’s system saw the HVAC contractor’s system as a trusted user, the
criminals were able to gain access to the Target system and install their malware); NIELS
FERGUSON, BRUCE SCHNEIER, & TADAYOSHI KOHNO, CRYPTOGRAPHY ENGINEERING 10
(2010) (discussing the human element of cyber attacks).
55. See FERGUSON, SCHNEIER & KOHNO, supra note 54, at 10 (“[M]any of the really
harmful attacks are performed by insiders, and a firewall does not protect against insiders at
all.”).
56. Although it may be as simple as eavesdropping on unencrypted communications.
See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.
57. Of course, these methods of exploiting vulnerabilities in the data chain are not
mutually exclusive. For example, spyware, which is a form of snooping, is often installed
on the target system through the use of spoofing, or fooling a user into clicking a link or
downloading a file that contains malware. See, e.g., Gable, supra note 52, at 82 (“Spoofing
attacks are concentrated on impersonating a particular user or computer, usually in order to
launch other types of attacks.”). Similarly, phishing is used to effectuate a spoofing attack:
the cybercriminals send out emails to multitudes of users who may do business with a
certain bank, posing as the bank, and trick users into entering personal information into
spoof websites or into clicking links that install malware on their systems, enabling further
snooping attacks. See, e.g., Shields, supra note 36, at 349 (“Phishing is when a
cybercriminal sends an email, text, or pop-up message asking for personal or financial
information.”); see also id. at 350 (“After phishing compromises a user’s computer,
cybercriminals can install malware. . . . [which can be used to] monitor and control online
activity, steal confidential information, and commit fraud.” (footnote omitted)).
58. MICROSOFT TECHNET, Common Types of Network Attacks, https://technet.
microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc959354.aspx [https://perma.cc/TF94-H47X] (last visited Dec.
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legitimate statistical research on public data,59 for this article’s purposes it
refers to malicious software that runs in the background to access data
without permission.60 Snooping can occur anywhere in the data chain, but
for the purposes of analyzing it as a general cybersecurity vulnerability,
this Article will examine snooping later in the data chain: in the data
processing link, by theft or unauthorized use in the use and dissemination
link, or later in the storage link.61 The result is that data essentially “leaks”
out of an otherwise secure system and is then used for malicious
purposes.62
Sabotage, of course, can be the most damaging vulnerability. While
difficult to effect in the flight operation phase, data sabotage can result in
wholesale data destruction or the capture and malicious encryption of data
later held for ransom and the dubious promise of un-encryption upon
payment of the ransom.63 Recent data-ransom targets typically include

17, 2016) (“When an attacker is eavesdropping on your communications, it is referred to as
sniffing or snooping.”).
59. For example, it should come as no surprise that a person’s Internet Service
Provider, or ISP, knows every website that person visits while online. See, e.g., Lincoln
Spector, Is Your ISP Spying on You?, PCWORLD (Sept. 3, 2012, 7:42 AM),
http://www.pcworld.com/article/261752/is_your_isp_spying_on_you_.html [https://perma.
cc/2E84-PGKS] (“Your Internet service provider tracks what IP addresses you contact,
which effectively means they know the web sites you’re visiting. They can also read
anything you send over the Internet that isn’t encrypted.”). See also Paul Ohm, The Rise
and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1438 (“How much
personal information flows through an ISP’s wires and is stored on its computers? In
modern connected life, almost no other entity can access as much personal information.”).
60. Jason Krause, Beware of Spyware: Litigants Sometimes Resort to Computer
Snooping, But It Could be a Crime, 91 A.B.A. J. 57, 59 (2005) (“Software that spies on a
person’s computer is easy to install and very difficult to detect.”).
61. For example, in our hypothetical, once the UAS company uploads the video onto its
system, it would be vulnerable to a snooping attack, even before it was transmitted to the
real estate agency if, for example, the UAS company had unwittingly installed spyware onto
its system.
62. While snooping is typically associated with malicious software, or “spyware,”
snooping may also be done using hardware, which may be harder to detect. See Krause,
supra note 60, at 55 (describing the “KeyKatcher,” a keylogging snooping device that plugs
in between the keyboard and computer, as “so small and innocuous it looks like part of the
keyboard PS2 connector.”).
63. See, e.g., Robert McMillan, In the Bitcoin Era, Ransomware Attacks Surge, WALL
ST. J. (Aug. 19, 2016, 11:59 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/in-the-bitcoin-eraransomware-attacks-surge-1471616632 [https://perma.cc/9XML-TKV2] (describing one
victim’s payment of $500 in Bitcoin to hackers in order to unencrypt his Excel and Word
documents that the hackers had maliciously encrypted by use of a virus or other malware).
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hospital and patient records,64 but imagery and data gathered by drones
could easily be subject to the same scheme.65 To return to our hypothetical
and adjust it slightly, if the data processors withheld the images and video
of the couple’s intimate moments from public publication, the images
would still be vulnerable to a sabotage (or ransom) attack if hackers
managed to access the stored data and get the images.
The fourth link in the data chain includes data use, dissemination, and
storage. Like the third link, data in use, dissemination, or storage is
vulnerable to a multitude of cyber attacks, either human or bot-based,
starting with software or hardware-based packet sniffing that usually leads
to either a spoof attack or a continuous snooping attack facilitated by
malicious software installed on the user’s processor or storage device.66
Data sabotage is a vulnerability in the fourth link as well.67 Akin to a
human virus or disease pandemic, more travel and human contact correlates
to a higher infection rate; similarly, the more a dataset or information
packet travels and the more Internet contact occurs, the higher the exposure
to software viruses or malware.68
The cybersecurity vulnerabilities just discussed are neither novel nor
solely a problem in the UAS industry, but they raise interesting questions
because of the leveraged data gathering capabilities drones provide.
B. Lack of Regulation for Collection, Use, Retention, and Dissemination
of Imagery, Data, and Information by UAS
The regulatory scheme for aviation activities and consequent liability
for negligence in aviation operations is well established.69 Two primary
64. Kaveh Waddell, A Hospital Paralyzed by Hackers, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 17, 2016)
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/02/hackers-are-holding-a-hospitals-pat
ient-data-ransom/463008/ [https://perma.cc/AQA4-AGZG].
65. Indeed this is increasingly likely as ransomware attacks have been rising at an
alarming rate. See McMillan, supra note 63 (“According to the U.S. Department of Justice,
ransomware attacks have quadrupled this year from a year ago, averaging 4,000 a day.”).
66. Because the use, dissemination, and storage of the data subjects it to the same
computing platforms and network vulnerabilities as the post-data flight processing that
occurs in the third link, the vulnerabilities are largely the same. See supra notes 52–65 and
accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.
68. This vulnerability makes sense when one considers the structure of the internet. As
data travels from host computer to host computer, it is subject to potential compromise or
infection at each step.
69. See Mgmt. Activities Inc. v. United States, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1157 (C.D. Cal. 1998)
(providing a comprehensive aggregation of the duties of care and law applicable to
aviators); Merritt v. Shuttle, Inc., 187 F.3d 263, 268–70 (2d Cir. 1999) (discussing appellate
subject matter jurisdiction as appropriate in aviation matters).
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factors contributed to a regulatory and legal regime that supports one of the
statistically safest industries—air transportation—in the domestic United
States.70 First, the enabling statutory language for the Federal Aviation
Administration (“FAA”) requires the agency to consider safety first, above
all other considerations.71 Second, the aviation administrative law system
enforces aviation regulations under the principle of “safety first” while
following Chevron’s72 deference to the FAA.73 FAA enforcement actions
are subject to independent judicial review by an administrative law judge
(ALJ), the National Transportation Safety Board (N.T.S.B.),74 and finally,
the federal courts.75
In 2014, the N.T.S.B., in Huerta v. Pirker, established that UAS are,
in fact, aircraft subject to FAA regulation.76 The FAA Administrator
assessed a $10,000 fine against respondent Raphael Pirker in 2012 for
Pirker’s allegedly negligent or reckless operation of a Ritewing Zephyr
drone near the campus of the University of Virginia, which violated
existing FAA regulations.77 Pirker was accused of flying the drone within
ten feet of the ground, at altitudes up to 1,500 feet, through a traffic-filled
tunnel, and within 100 feet of an active heliport. Pirker allegedly used the
drone to run down a pedestrian on the sidewalk such that the hapless
individual was forced to “take immediate evasive maneuvers so as to avoid
being struck by the aircraft.”78 Pirker moved to dismiss the Administrator’s
Order of Assessment, arguing that the regulation he allegedly violated only
applied to aircraft, but not to “model aircraft.”79 The ALJ agreed and

70. How Aviation Safety Has Improved, ALLIANZ, http://www.agcs.allianz.com/insights
/expert-risk-articles/how-aviation-safety-has-improved/ [https://perma.cc/FG53-YSSN] (last
visited Dec. 17, 2016).
71. 49 U.S.C. § 40104(a) (2012).
72. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (holding
that where Congress has delegated regulatory authority to a federal agency which has
provided an administrative interpretation of an otherwise silent or ambiguous portion of a
statute within which it has been delegated authority, “the question for the court is whether
the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”).
73. 49 C.F.R. § 821 (2016).
74. Id. § 821.2.
75. Id. § 821.64(a).
76. Huerta v. Pirker, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5730, 2014 WL 8095629, at *5 (N.T.S.B.
Nov. 17, 2014) (granting Chevron deference to the FAA Administrator’s prior interpretation
of what constitutes an “aircraft” under 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(6) and 14 C.F.R. § 1.1).
77. Id. at *1. The regulation giving rise to the charge was 14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a) (2016),
which proscribes, inter alia, operation of an aircraft “in a careless or reckless manner so as
to endanger the life or property of another.” Id.
78. Huerta, at *1 (quoting the complaint).
79. Id. at *8.
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dismissed the Administrator’s Order of Assessment.80 The Administrator
appealed to the N.T.S.B., which reversed the ALJ and held that “an
‘aircraft’ is any ‘device’ ‘used for flight in the air.’ This definition includes
any aircraft, manned or unmanned, large or small.”81
The robust existing system of aviation regulations, however, is silent
as to regulating the data chain—the collection, use, retention, and
dissemination of any imagery, data, or information gathered by UAS flight
operations. The FAA simply has no statutory or adjudicated authority to
regulate it. However, judging by the amount of time and effort devoted to
discussing privacy issues related to UAS operations,82 the industry and the
FAA are clearly aware of the problem.
Even though the FAA has no authority to regulate the data chain, the
agency continues to address it.83 Incorporation by reference of a
satisfactory privacy regulatory scheme would be effective. Incorporation
of other federal statutes or regulations is not foreign to the Federal Aviation
Regulations. For example, regulations on hazardous lithium batteries
contained in the Hazardous Material Regulations section of the Code of
Federal Regulations (“CFR”) are incorporated into the Aviation CFR.84 No
suggestion of such an incorporation for data protection has been made
either by the FAA or commentators. Therefore, it appears that a
comprehensive regulatory structure for the data chain of remotely sensed
data by drones does not exist.85
Federal laws regulating certain aspects of cybersecurity and the data
chain do, of course, exist. The problem is that they set up only coarse,
piecemeal regulation of remotely sensed data. The relevant existing federal
laws related to remote sensing by drones include the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”),86 the Privacy Act,87 and even the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.88 The ECPA, which
80. Id. at *11.
81. Id. at *5 (quoting 14 C.F.R. § 1.1).
82. See Press Release—DOT and FAA Finalize Rules for Small Unmanned Aircraft
Systems, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (June 21, 2016), https://www.faa.gov/news/
press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=20515 [https://perma.cc/4LJY-EH5K] (last visited
Dec. 18, 2016).
83. Id.
84. 14 C.F.R. § 171.2(e).
85. Vacek, supra note 20.
86. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
87. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 § 3 (codified as amended at
5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012)).
88. U.S. CONST. amend IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
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includes the Wiretap Act,89 the Stored Communications Act,90 and the Pen
Register Act,91 generally prohibits the unauthorized interception and use of
the contents of electronic communications.92 A drone equipped with
remote sensing equipment tuned to eavesdrop on a particular bandwidth
would intercept electronic communication if it were eavesdropping on the
content.93 While the ECPA proscribes such activity, the prohibition does
not apply to the interception of non-content, or metadata.94 Metadata
includes information similar to that found on the outside of a traditionally
addressed and mailed private, sealed letter: the sender, receiver, their
addresses, and the date of mailing.95 Digital metadata can include routing
information as well. Thus, since the ECPA addresses only one potential
use of UAS, it ceases to apply once data is gathered in the first and second
links of the data chain.
Applicable to data further down the chain is the Stored
Communications Act (“SCA”),96 which, through the ECPA, protects data
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.”).
89. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, tit. 3, sec. 802, §§ 2510–
2520 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2510–2522).
90. Electronic Communications Privacy Act § 201 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–
2710).
91. Electronic Communications Privacy Act § 301 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–
3126).
92. 18 U.S.C. § 2510.
93. “‘[E]lectronic communication’ means any transfer of signs, signals, writing,
images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire,
radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or
foreign commerce . . . .” § 2510(12).
94. See Vacek, supra note 20, at 471 n.33 (“Metadata is data that describes other data,
which includes structural information and descriptive information.”).
95. This is distinguished from content data, or the contents inside the hypothetical
envelope. “Contents” is a defined term under the ECPA, which means “when used with
respect to any wire, oral, or electronic communication, includes any information concerning
the substance, purport, or meaning of that communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (emphasis
added). This distinction is significant because certain provisions of the ECPA proscribe
only the disclosure of contents of wire, oral, or electronic communications, and thus, by
negative implication, do not apply to the disclosure of metadata. See, e.g., § 2702(a)(1) (“a
person or entity providing an electronic communication service to the public shall not
knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents of a communication while in
electronic storage by that service . . . .” (emphasis added)); Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to
the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1208, 1221 (2004) (“§ 2702 has slightly different exceptions depending on whether
the information to be voluntarily disclosed consists of content or noncontent information.”).
96. §§ 2701–2710.
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stored on a server. While the ECPA generally protects data in transit, the
SCA aims to prevent unauthorized access to data stored by third-party
providers.97 The statute is considered overly complex, and there is some
discussion of what exactly constitutes “stored communications” depending
on length of time the data remains on a particular server, whether it is
opened or not, and whether the communication is deemed “content” or
“non-content.”98 Generally speaking, however, the SCA is likely the most
relevant federal law to illuminate the data chain problem presented here.
Given the statutory duty of care imposed on data storage providers,99 its
narrow definitions only apply to a few applications of UAS gathered
data.100 This leads to an important distinction: Data voluntarily provided to
an aggregator, such as a Facebook user sharing private information about a
romantic experience, is subject to the contractual terms of the user
agreement.101 Therefore, Facebook does not violate the SCA through
disclosures of that data if made pursuant to the terms of its user agreement,
to the extent that those terms are lawful.102 Such user agreements often
provide consent for the aggregators to use the data in a multitude of
ways.103 For UAS-gathered data, such as our hypothetical couple’s
intimate moment, there is no such user agreement and no such consent
given. Absent the knowing disclosure of information by the electronic

97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 95, at 1227–28.
99. Albeit only in narrowly defined circumstances, assuming such data provider is a
“public” provider, since the SCA has been held by implication not to apply to “nonpublic
providers,” Andersen Consulting, LLP v. UOP, 991 F. Supp. 1041, 1042 (N.D. Ill. 1998)
(“[T]he statute covers any entity that provides electronic communication service (e.g.,
e-mail) to the community at large.”), and only in the event that voluntary disclosure by the
provider is not permissible pursuant to one of the many statutory exceptions to the SCA,
§ 2702(b).
100. First, § 2702 only applies to public data providers. See supra note 99. Second, the
prohibition on voluntary disclosure in § 2702(a) does not apply to the voluntary disclosure
of non-content data, or metadata, as discussed supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text.
Finally, even content data may be voluntarily disclosed with the user’s consent.
§ 2702(b)(3).
101. See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Propertization Metaphors for Bargaining Power and
Control of the Self in the Information Age, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 69, 79–81 (2006) (arguing
that, in the face of increasingly overbearing contracts of adhesion in the Internet context,
consumer data should be recognized as a property right and either protected as such or held
to be inalienable as a matter of law).
102. § 2702(b)(3) (providing that public providers may voluntarily disclose the contents
of a communication “with the lawful consent of the originator . . . .”).
103. See, e.g., FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/terms [https://perma.cc/7X7DCH8F] (last visited Dec. 18, 2016).
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communication service provider, the narrow protections offered by the
SCA are not helpful in most data breach situations.
Continuing with the issue of consent, Congress enacted the Privacy
Act of 1974 to set limits on federal agencies’ collection, maintenance, use,
and dissemination of personally identifiable information about
individuals.104 As codified, the act contains twelve exceptions allowing
disclosure of data without consent.105 The relevant exceptions for liability
for cybersecurity issues include a “need to know” within an agency,106
“routine uses,”107 and law enforcement requests.108 Those exceptions only
apply to government agency use, however. Much more commonplace
collectors, maintainers, users, and disseminators of data are commercial
entities such as Google, Facebook, LexisNexis, and Thomson Reuters. The
Privacy Act does not apply to private companies such as those listed.109
Therefore, users of private data services do not enjoy any federal
protections under the Privacy Act or under the Stored Communication Act
if they have waived those rights in user agreements.
Finally, given recent decisions about consensual release of data, even
the Fourth Amendment and remote sensing cases fail to establish a
comprehensive structure to adequately address the data chain problem.110
In United States v. Skinner, law enforcement tracked the defendant’s
location information, broadcasted from his mobile phone, without a search
warrant.111 The defendant argued that the Fourth Amendment prohibits
such warrantless tracking as unreasonable.112 The Court held that mobile

104. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 § 2(b)(1)-(2) (“The purpose
of this Act is to provide certain safeguards for an individual against an invasion of personal
privacy by requiring Federal agencies, except as otherwise provided by law, to–(1) permit
an individual to determine what records pertaining to him are collected, maintained, used, or
disseminated by such agencies; (2) permit an individual to prevent records pertaining to him
obtained by such agencies for a particular purpose from being used or made available for
another purpose without his consent . . . .”).
105. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b).
106. § 552a(b)(1).
107. § 552a(b)(3).
108. § 552a(b)(7).
109. See § 522a(b) (“No agency shall disclose any record . . . .”) (emphasis added));
§ 552a(a)(1) (incorporating the definition of agency as codified in 5 U.S.C. § 522);
18 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) (defining “agency” as “any executive department, military
department, Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other
establishment in the executive branch of the Government (including the Executive Office of
the President), or any independent regulatory agency”).
110. See, e.g., United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 780 (6th Cir. 2012).
111. Id. at 775.
112. Id. at 777.
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phone users have no “reasonable expectation of privacy in the data given
off” by their devices.113 Other relevant remote sensing cases include
Florida v. Jardines, in which the Court compared a drug-sniffing dog’s
nose to a remote sensor,114 and United States v. Jones, in which the Court
prohibited the warrantless use of a GPS tracker on a suspect’s vehicle.115
However, in both Jardines and Jones, the Court held that Fourth
Amendment searches occurred because of physical trespass.116 When read
together, those cases suggest that warrantless surveillance of metadata by
law enforcement and governmental agencies is largely permitted so long as
no physical intrusion occurs. This, along with the prevalence of “contracts
of adhesion” by large companies requiring users to consent to third-party
access of their data, together yield the result that citizens and consumers
who use technology in even the most basic ways functionally waive control
over their data.117 Private data appears to have scant legal protection
anywhere after the second link in the data chain.
Since federal law does not give meaningful protection to data gathered
by drone, an injured plaintiff may turn to traditional tort law for a remedy.
As with products liability, where manufacturers of products retain liability
throughout the product’s life, the question arises whether UAS operators,
as “producers” of the data product, similarly retain liability. “The
contractor who builds the scaffold invites the owner’s workmen to use it.
The manufacturer who sells the automobile to the retail dealer invites the
dealer’s customers to use it.”118 Does not the UAS operator who gathers
the data invite the use of that data? The invitation may be to a specific
person or an indeterminate class, “but in each case it is equally plain, and in
each its consequences must be the same.”119 Should not the consequences
of a data breach be attributable in some way to the producer of that data,
like products liability?

113. Id.
114. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1416–17 (2013).
115. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
116. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417; Jones at 951–52.
117. See, e.g., Barnhizer, supra note 101, at 71–72 (“The modern reality of highly
sophisticated forms of adhesion contract—browse-wrap and click-wrap contracts—appears
to exacerbate the lack of assent and take-it-or-leave-it nature of consumer adhesion
contracts. As some commentators have noted, the fiction of consumer assent to such new
forms of adhesion contracts is even more absurd than with their paper-based counterpart.
Just as with the relatively crude paper-based contracts, few consumers ever bother to read
these terms, and the nature of online contracting permits producers to hide their boilerplate
terms far more effectively than even the finest of fine prints.” (footnotes omitted)).
118. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1054 (N.Y. 1916).
119. Id.
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It appears that the rule of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company—that
a duty of care exists if a product reasonably expected to be dangerous is
negligently made and is known to be used by those other than the original
purchaser120—may have an exception for UAS data. Even though the sale
of a data product would ordinarily be subject to products liability laws,
liability for data breaches or negligence on the part of the original data
gatherer (the UAS operator) is problematic due to attenuation.121 Article III
standing requirements and third-party liability limitations effectively leave
potential plaintiffs without a remedy in tort because they may not be
foreseeable users of UAS data or victims of its unauthorized
dissemination.122
Unfortunately for the couple from our hypothetical, even a
technological solution is not a viable protector of their private moments.
Vulnerabilities in general,123 in the software code used for flight controls or
navigation,124 and in data and server management125 will persist as long as
“informal code” is used.126 “Informal code” describes the vast majority of
software—it works well enough most of the time but might have bugs or
errors.127 On the other hand, “formal code,” where computer logic is
subject to mathematical proof at each step of an operation, results in each
step of the software code returning a single possibility, closing the
“backdoors” and bugs that cybercriminals exploit.128 However, such secure
technology comes at a significant price—slow processing speeds and huge
amounts of necessary memory for the simplest operations.129 Similarly,
120. Id.
121. See infra Part II.
122. See infra Part II.
123. See Kevin Hartnett, Computer Scientists Close in on Perfect, Hack-Proof Code,
WIRED (Sept. 23, 2016, 8:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2016/09/computer-scientistsclose-perfect-hack-proof-code/ [https://perma.cc/5RAJ-9NKA].
124. Alan Kim et al., Vulnerabilities Analysis for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, AM. INST.
OF AERONAUTICS & ASTRONAUTICS, CYBER ATTACK 6–13 (2012), https://pdfs.
semanticscholar.org/1a95/4775dd9a2596b7543af7693d707415077289.pdf [https://perma.cc
/7DN3-NKHA].
125. Andrew V. Schmidt, Note, Cyberterrorism: Combating the Aviation Industry’s
Vulnerability to Cyberattack, 39 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 169, 181–84 (2016)
(discussing cyber vulnerabilities in the aviation industry).
126. See Hartnett, supra note 123 (discussing informal and formal computer codes).
127. See id. (“[M]ost computer code . . . is written informally and evaluated based
mainly on whether it works . . . .”).
128. Id. (“[F]ormally verified software reads like a mathematical proof: Each statement
follows logically from the preceding one. An entire program can be tested with the same
certainty that mathematicians prove theorems.”).
129. Id. (“[A] program that includes its formal verification information can be five times
as long as a traditional program that was written to achieve the same end.”).
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blockchain authentication,130 a cybersecurity protocol where each
subsequent operation requires the verification of all prior operations, also
requires significant computing power to run.131 UAS are limited by weight
due to aerodynamic considerations and limited in battery life due to those
weight limitations.132 Therefore, the use of small, lightweight processors,
flight controllers, and sensors is necessary.133 Small UAS simply cannot
carry the batteries or computing power required to run formal code or block
chain authentication.134 Even if the energy or processing requirements
were solved, the expense to do so is likely prohibitive.
Fears of privacy invasions, such as the involuntary exposure of the
hypothetical couple’s intimate moment, spurred President Obama to order
an independent agency review of the lack of a privacy and data
management regulatory structure as applied to UAS operations in 2015.135
The process was conducted by the National Telecommunications
Information Agency136 and produced a concise best practices document,
130. Bitcoin uses block chain authentication to effectively prevent fraud. See Jay
Schulman, How Bitcoin Could Prevent Real Estate Fraud in Cook County, CHICAGO (Dec.
9, 2016), http://www.chicagomag.com/city-life/December-2016/Cook-County-BitcoinBlockchain/ [https://perma.cc/2J9E-BCDE].
131. See Trevor I. Kiviat, Note, Beyond Bitcoin: Issues in Regulating Blockchain
Transactions, 65 DUKE L.J. 569, 579 & n.70 (2015) (explaining that the blockchain
validation system powering Bitcoin is dependent on the network participants’
“computational power,” which “essentially refers to how fast a machine can perform an
operation.”).
132. See supra notes 21–27 and accompanying text (describing limitations of a typical
consumer-grade UAS).
133. The DJI Phantom 4, for example, weighs in at 1380 grams, or about 3 pounds. See
supra notes 21–27 and accompanying text.
134. Recall that small UAS must have a combined takeoff weight of less than 55 pounds,
supra note 11. Compare the 3-pound weight of the DJI Phantom 4 with that of the U.S.
military’s well-known Predator drone, which weighs 1,130 pounds when empty and takes
off carrying up to 665 pounds of fuel and an additional 450 pound payload. U.S. AIR
FORCE, MQ-1B Predator (Sept. 23, 2015), http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display
/tabid/224/Article/104469/mq-1b-predator.aspx [https://perma.cc/6BNR-NP4A].
135. Promoting Economic Competitiveness While Safeguarding Privacy, Civil Rights,
and Civil Liberties in Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed. Reg. 9355,
9357 (Feb. 20, 2015) [hereinafter Presidential Memo], https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR2015-02-20/pdf/2015-03727.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VHV-AZSJ] (“There is hereby
established a multi-stakeholder engagement process to develop and communicate best
practices for privacy, accountability, and transparency issues regarding commercial and
private UAS use in the NAS. The process will include stakeholders from the private
sector.”).
136. Id. (“Within 90 days of the date of this memorandum, the Department of
Commerce, through the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, and
in consultation with other interested agencies, will initiate this multi-stakeholder
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which is discussed below.137 Around the same time, various other federal
agencies and private industry actors also produced their own best practices
and internal guidance documents related to privacy and data chain
management in UAS operations.138 Together, these guidance documents
may establish a duty of care for UAS operations.
C. Best Practices Documents for Collecting and Managing Sensitive or
Private Data That Are Voluntary Only
A study conducting a broad review on commercial drone literature in
research, magazine, and news databases from 2010 to 2015 identified key
areas of social and ethical concerns related to commercial drone use.139
The most frequently cited concern was in the area of law and regulation
with privacy issues falling closely behind.140 It is reasonable to conclude
that concerns of law and regulation overlap both categories of flight
operations as well as cybersecurity, since privacy issues would not be a
relevant concern but for drones’ abilities to conduct remote sensing
activities of private activities. Similar concerns led UAS operators,
including governmental operators,141 universities,142 and the industry
itself,143 to produce several guidance documents during the same timeframe
that indicate a discipline-specific focus on the difficult questions of data
privacy and cybersecurity. Taken together, these guidance documents may

engagement process to develop a framework regarding privacy, accountability, and
transparency for commercial and private UAS use.”).
137. See Multistakeholders convened by Nat’l Telecomms. & Info. Admin., Voluntary
Best Practices for UAS Privacy, Transparency, and Accountability (2016) [hereinafter
Voluntary Best Practices], https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/uas_privacy_
best_practices_6-21-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/97UH-GN3L].
138. See, e.g., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., WORKING GROUP TO SAFEGUARD PRIVACY,
CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE DEPARTMENT’S USE AND SUPPORT OF UNMANNED
AERIAL SYSTEMS 2 (2012) [hereinafter DHS MEMO], https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/working-group-to-safeguard-privacy-civil-rights-and-civil-liberties-in-thedepartments-use-and-support-of-unmanned-aerial-systems-uas-s1-information.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3KSN-PXKE]; Code of Conduct, ASS’N FOR UNMANNED VEHICLE SYS. INT’L,
[hereinafter AUVSI Code of Conduct] http://www.auvsi.org/content/conduct [https://
perma.cc/CPN3-BBW5].
139. Rocci Luppicini & Arthur So, A Technoethical Review of Commercial Drone Use in
the Context of Governance, Ethics, and Privacy, 46 TECH. IN SOC’Y 109, 111–12 (2016).
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., DHS MEMO, supra note 138.
142. See, e.g., U.N.D., Committee on Unmanned Aircraft System Research Ethics &
Privacy, https://und.edu/research/resources/uas-research-ethics-privacy.cfm [https://perma.
cc/EX4T-MNKP].
143. AUVSI Code of Conduct, supra note 138.
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equip future courts with enough evidence of an industry-wide standard of
care for UAS cybersecurity throughout the data chain.144
In the interim, the broader UAS industry had the opportunity to
comment on a “best practices” forum hosted by the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) pursuant to a
2015 Presidential Memorandum.145
The Memorandum established
UAS-specific guidelines for federal agencies to protect privacy,
accountability, transparency, and reporting, including a requirement for
agencies to “at least every 3 years, examine their existing UAS policies and
procedures related to the collection, use, retention, and dissemination of
information obtained by UAS . . . .”146 The NTIA forum produced a “best
practices” document intended to provide guidance to all UAS operators.147
Even though the document itself claims that it is not intended to establish a
standard of care or the basis for statutory or regulatory obligations, a court
could find it does establish such a standard of care, in whole or in part, if
sufficient evidence of use exists.148 Part IV of the document, titled
“Voluntary Best Practices,”149 includes five elements directly applicable to
privacy and data chain management.150
Overall, these best practices request that operators simply provide
notice and act reasonably.151 Upon closer examination, however, the best
practices implicitly recognize the inherent privacy problem framed by this
Article—that once gathered, data receives very little protection and
potential plaintiffs have very little recourse. A footnote in the best
practices document sums it up nicely: “These Best Practices recognize that
UAS operators may not be able to predict all future use of data.
Accordingly, these Best Practices do not intend to discourage unplanned or
innovative data uses that may result in desirable economic or societal

144. Voluntary Best Practices, supra note 137.
145. Presidential Memo, supra note 135.
146. Id. at 9355–56.
147. See Voluntary Best Practices, supra note 137, at 5 (“These voluntary Best Practices
for UAS focus on data collected via a UAS, which includes both commercial and noncommercial UAS.”).
148. Id. at 2 (“In some cases, these Best Practices are meant to go beyond existing law
and they do not—and are not meant to—create a legal standard of care by which the
activities of any particular UAS operator should be judged.”).
149. Id. at 5.
150. Id. at 5–6. These five elements are: (1) Inform others of your use of UAS;
(2) Show care when operating UAS or collecting and storing covered data; (3) Limit the use
and sharing of covered data; (4) Secure covered data; and (5) Monitor and comply with
evolving federal, state, and local UAS laws. Id.
151. See id.
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benefits.”152 This statement supports an inference that the “exciting
possibilities that come with [UAS]” may trump the “responsible, ethical,
and respectful” duties and “commitment to transparency, privacy, and
accountability” outlined for UAS operators by the Voluntary Best
Practices.153
Even if a court finds the duties and standards suggested by the
Voluntary Best Practices have become a de facto standard of care for UAS
remote sensing activities, existing law—including constitutional standing
requirements and third-party liability limitations—probably limits UAS
operators’ liability for breaches in the data chain, depending on where in
the data chain the breach occurs.
II. LIMITED LIABILITY FOR DATA BREACHES
The liability issues related to cybersecurity and database breaches
have been discussed in terms of standing,154 duty under tort law,155 and in
other contexts, such as security breaches of financial service providers,156
and communication and user privacy in social media.157 The legal
principles that limit liability in those contexts apply similarly in UAS
remote sensing and the data chain context.158
Current standing
requirements159 as applied to data breaches frequently deprive potential
plaintiffs of standing.160 Third-party liability limitations also limit potential
plaintiffs’ abilities to sue, because well-established principles of tort law
applied to data breach cases usually prevent recovery absent a business or

152. Id. at 5 n.3.
153. Id. at 2.
154. Arthur R. Vorbrodt, Note, Clapper Dethroned: Imminent Injury and Standing for
Data Breach Lawsuits in Light of Ashley Madison, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 61
(2016).
155. Vincent R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of Tort Liability,
57 S.C. L. REV. 255 (2005).
156. Huggins v. Citibank, 585 S.E.2d 275 (S.C. 2003).
157. Christopher J. Borchert, Fernando M. Pinguelo & David Thaw, Reasonable
Expectations of Privacy Settings: Social Media and the Stored Communications Act, 13
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 36 (2015).
158. See infra Section II.A.
159. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (discussing the three
requirements for standing) (citations omitted); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95,
101–02 (1983) (discussing the injury requirement of standing) (citations omitted).
160. See infra Section II.A.
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legal relationship, which is usually lacking between the UAS operator and
the subject whose data is breached.161
A. Article III Standing Requirements: Precluding Negligence Lawsuits in
Data Breach Cases
Whether a person injured by a data breach has constitutional standing
has been addressed by multiple courts at the state and federal levels. The
Seventh162 and Ninth163 Circuits answered in the affirmative, and the Third
Circuit in the negative.164 In Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, the
Supreme Court addressed standing for future injuries comparable to those
which may occur in data breach cases.165 Commentators have interpreted
Clapper to impose stricter requirements for standing: plaintiffs must be
able to show future injury is “certainly impending.”166 Notwithstanding
Clapper’s more stringent requirement, the majority also noted that standing
may be available to plaintiffs showing a “substantial risk” of injury.167
Requiring plaintiffs alleging future injuries from a data breach to meet a
stricter requirement by showing an injury is “certainly impending” would
effectively bar most data breach plaintiffs from proceeding.168 On the other
hand, applying the “substantial risk” standard would provide data breach
plaintiffs an easier time showing injury in fact. Still, however, they must
satisfy the other two elements of standing.
For plaintiffs alleging injury due to data breach caused by a snooping
drone, the actual flight activity may be their only recourse—such as
161. See generally, e.g., Durkee v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d 742,
748 (W.D.N.C. 2011) (“The duty owed by a defendant to a plaintiff is determined by the
relationship subsisting between them.” (citing Kientz v. Carlton, 96 S.E.2d 14, 17 (N.C.
1957))); Durden v. United States, 736 F.3d 296, 304 (4th Cir. 2013) (“In general, there is
neither a duty to control the actions of a third party, nor to protect another from a third
party.” (quoting Scadden v. Holt, 733 S.E.2d 90, 92 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012))). See also infra
Section II.B.
162. Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2015).
163. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 413 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated and remanded,
135 S. Ct. 1540, 1545 (May 16, 2016) (holding that the Ninth Circuit failed to consider in
detail the particularity and concreteness of plaintiff’s injury and accordingly remanded for
analysis of both standing requirements).
164. Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38 (3d Cir. 2011).
165. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
166. Bradford C. Mank, Clapper v. Amnesty International: Two or Three Competing
Philosophies of Standing Law?, 81 TENN. L. REV. 211, 214 (2014).
167. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1150 n.5 (citations omitted).
168. See, e.g., Mank, supra note 166; Whalen v. Michael Stores Inc., 153 F. Supp. 3d
577 (E.D.N.Y. 2015); Khan v. Children’s Nat’l Health Sys., No. TDC-15-2125, 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 66404, at *3–7 (D. Md. May 19, 2016).

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2017

25

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 3

160

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:1

trespass in our hypothetical couple’s case. Showing “certainly impending”
damages due to the leaked intimate videos would be more difficult than
showing a “substantial risk” of injury. As the imagery and video become
widely distributed on the Internet, the harm to the hypothetical couple’s
reputation may increase while, paradoxically, the legal harm becomes more
attenuated. Data breach cases related to financial or identity fraud, such as
that in Reilly v. Ceridian Corp.,169 illustrate this phenomenon. In Reilly, the
plaintiff’s data, stored by defendant, was hacked.170 The plaintiffs were
notified of the breach and later sued, alleging risk of future harm.171 The
court held that mere allegation of future harm did not meet constitutional
standing requirements, despite the cost incurred with monitoring credit.172
On the other hand, in Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, where
hackers breached the retailer’s database and stole customers’ credit card
numbers, the court found that costs directly associated with monitoring
credit scores to guard against potential future fraud met the Clapper
requirement for “certainly impending injury.”173 For our hypothetical
couple, there would be no threat to their credit. Their privacy and
reputation were injured but, absent financial repercussions, they would not
meet the standing requirement.
Most recently, a district court suggested that standing exists in a data
breach case when a plaintiff can show either: “(1) actual examples of the
use of the fruits of the data breach for identity theft, even if involving other
victims; or (2) a clear indication that the data breach was for the purpose of
using the plaintiffs’ personal data to engage in identity fraud.”174
From these cases, it seems that unless a data breach specifically harms
an individual financially, the footholds needed to scale the slope of
standing would be absent175 However, the vast majority of data breach
plaintiffs do not articulate a direct legal or financial harm as a result of the

169. Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38 (3d Cir. 2011).
170. Id. at 40.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 43–46.
173. Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2015).
174. Khan v. Children’s Nat’l Health Sys., No. TDC-15-2125, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
66404, at *14 (D. Md. May 19, 2016).
175. Data breach plaintiffs tend to be single members of huge classes or single data
points in huge databases. The data breach in Reilly affected approximately 27,000 people,
664 F.3d at 40, while the breach at issue in Remijas affected 350,000, 794 F.3d at 690. The
2013 Target Corp. breach affected an estimated 40 million consumers. Gregory Wallace,
Target Credit Card Hack: What You Need to Know, CNN (Dec. 23, 2013, 11:43 AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2013/12/22/news/companies/target-credit-card-hack/ [https://perma
.cc/RR4A-3GPP].
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data breach.176 Many do, of course, suffer attenuated harm, such as the
hassle and expense of obtaining new credit cards, closing compromised
accounts, or fixing inaccurate credit reports. But each link in the data chain
further attenuates the harm with the eventual result that, legally, the injury
becomes speculation.177
For those like our hypothetical couple who are injured by data
breaches affecting their privacy, becoming an unwilling public figure on
the Internet occurs after the first two links of the UAS data chain—drone
operation and data processing. The UAS operator’s liability for the flight
ends there due to third-party limitations such as foreseeability in tort and
lack of privity in contract.178
B. Third-Party Liability Limitations: Precluding Negligence Theory
Against UAS Operators
The landmark case of Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.
established the limits of a third-party’s duty and directly applies to the data
chain problem.179 “The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to
be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within
the range of apprehension.”180 A reasonable person would likely feel
apprehensive about a data breach compromising her sensitive information,
and the first part of the Palsgraf rule suggests that entities managing the
data chain would be liable for the risk of data breach as one that is
“reasonable to be perceived.” Under Palsgraf, a UAS operator must satisfy
its duty of care for flight operations and data gathering by ensuring any
176. See, e.g., Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 637 (7th Cir. 2007)
(affirming dismissal of putative class action seeking relief for data breach because the class
members had no compensable damages, chiefly because the court, faced with a novel
question under Indiana law, believed that “Indiana law would not recognize the costs of
credit monitoring that the plaintiffs seek to recover in this case as compensable damages.”).
177. See, e.g., In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 1304,
1309 (D. Minn. 2014) (declining to dismiss class members’ negligence claim against Target,
related to the data breach mentioned supra, where class members argued that “Target’s own
conduct, in failing to maintain appropriate data security measures and in turning off some of
the features of its security measures, created a foreseeable risk of the harm that occurred,
and Plaintiffs were the foreseeable victims of that harm.”). In the case of a UAS operator,
like the one in our hypothetical who has no relationship to the victims, liability in
negligence will turn on the foreseeability of the breach. It is arguably more foreseeable that
a UAS will crash during flight and cause injury, or allow a passerby to recover an onboard
camera and its contents, than it is that data captured from it will be hacked or exploited
somewhere down the data chain.
178. See supra notes 162–77 and accompanying text.
179. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
180. Id. at 100.
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imagery or video streamed down from the aircraft to the remote operator is
not inadvertently leaked, such as by broadcast on a public frequency. Since
that is a known vulnerability in the flight and data gathering phases, it is
likely a reasonably perceivable risk.181 A data breach due to a public data
transmission is likely a foreseeable event and thus would incur consequent
liability for the UAS operator. A UAS operator, like the one that
inadvertently captured the hypothetical couple’s intimate moment, could
probably refute a negligence claim by the couple that they had a duty to
avoid capturing the intimate imagery. A UAS operator may reasonably
claim to be in a similar position as the railroad in Palsgraf—unable to
foresee the results of a photo lawfully taken several steps down the data
chain—and argue that no duty runs back up the data chain from the
plaintiff. Importantly, in Palsgraf there was a legal relationship between
the parties—Ms. Palsgraf purchased a train ticket from the defendant
railroad company.182 A UAS operator engaged in remote sensing activities
of third parties has no legal relationship with the third parties, and the lack
of such a relationship would likely provide an effective defense to a
negligence suit.
Second, most data breaches are the result of malicious criminal acts by
third parties intent on stealing the data.183 In this far more common
scenario, Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp. would
apply, in which a landlord owed no duty “to provide protection commonly
owed by [law enforcement]”184 or to be “an insurer of the safety of his
tenants.”185 Under Kline, the hypothetical UAS operator likewise has no
common-law duty to protect the remotely sensed data from cybercriminal
hacking attempts such as sniffing, snooping, or spoofing.
A database provider, like a landlord, owns server space where data is
stored and would not, under Kline, have a duty to protect potential
cybercrime victims against criminal cyber attack. Courts have directly
addressed the question of whether there exists a common-law duty of care
for data possessors to secure user data from theft by cybercriminals. In
Huggins v. Citibank, the plaintiff sued the bank because a third-party
cybercriminal opened a credit account in the plaintiff’s name.186 The
181. See id. at 100 (discussing foreseeability).
182. Id. at 99 (“Plaintiff was standing on a platform of defendant’s railroad after buying
a ticket to go to Rockaway Beach.”).
183. VERIZON, 2016 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 3 fig.3 (2016),
http://sova.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/rp_DBIR_2016_Report_en_xg-1.pdf [https://
perma.cc/T28F-3VS6].
184. Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 487 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
185. Id.
186. Huggins v. Citibank, 585 S.E.2d. 275, 276 (S.C. 2003).
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plaintiff alleged the bank had a minimal duty to protect the plaintiff by
verifying the identity of the credit applicant before issuing the card.187 The
Court found that “in order for negligence liability to attach, the parties must
have a relationship recognized by law as the foundation of a duty of
care.”188 Most people would probably consider their financial data to be
the most deserving of legal protection, but “[t]he relationship, if any,
between [banks and victims of credit card fraud] is far too attenuated to rise
to the level of a duty between them.”189 This line of reasoning extends to
less sensitive areas of data privacy, such as software virus infections of
home computers with a similar result.190 Extending the analysis to UAS
operators, Huggins creates similar results for our hypothetical couple—the
UAS operator owes no duty of care to protect the couple’s privacy because
there is no legal relationship between the parties.
As a final note, it bears remembering that a contract may modify
common-law duties of care.191 A real estate agency may impose a duty
upon UAS operators to take certain precautions with their customers’ or
third-party beneficiaries’ data. Likewise, a contractual duty may require a
server space provider to protect server users against criminal cyber attack.
However, this Article focused on the default setting: the lack of a
regulatory structure for data gathering by UAS and the potential common
law liability between victims of data breaches and the UAS operator absent
special relationships or contractual liability.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 277.
189. Id.
190. See Emily Kuwahara, Note, Torts v. Contracts: Can Microsoft Be Held Liable to
Home Consumers for its Security Flaws?, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 997, 1025–31 (2007) (arguing
for an extension of products-liability law to cover software programs, invalidation of
warranty disclaimers used by software companies, and an exception to the economic loss
rule for software-related data breach losses).
191. Of course, depending on the facts, a breach of a contractual duty may give rise to a
breach of contract action, rather than a cause of action sounding in negligence. See, e.g.,
Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Rex Title Corp., 282 F.3d 292, 293 (4th Cir. 2002) (“In
general . . . Maryland does not recognize a cause of action for negligence arising solely from
a contractual relationship between two parties.” (citing Heckrotte v. Riddle, 168 A.2d 879,
882 (Md. 1961))). But see Eli Research, Inc. v. United Commc’ns Grp., LLC, 312 F. Supp.
2d 748, 758 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (“A duty to act for negligence purposes may flow from a
contract or statute or may be implied from attendant circumstances.” (citing Huyck Corp. v.
C.C. Mangum, Inc., 309 S.E.2d 183, 187 (N.C. 1983))); Hardin v. York Mem’l Park, 730
S.E.2d 768, 776 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (“[A] duty of care may arise out of a contractual
relationship, the theory being that accompanying every contract is a common-law duty to
perform with ordinary care the thing agreed to be done, and that a negligent performance
constitutes a tort as well as a breach of contract.” (quoting Olympic Prods. Co. v. Roof Sys.,
Inc., 363 S.E.2d 367, 371 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988))).
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CONCLUSION
Under current law, UAS operators are effectively relieved of liability
for negligence in the data chain beyond flight activity. Existing federal law
does not address liability for cybersecurity negligence or data breaches in
UAS operations. Further, current interpretations of Article III standing
requirements coupled with a lack of a required standard of care for UAS
operators to protect against cyber attack by third parties. These realities
result in the lack of a legal remedy for people whose private data is
captured by drone and later compromised in a cybersecurity breach.
Data breach plaintiffs struggle to meet Article III standing
requirements. Unless they can show more than an attenuated threat and
meet the “concrete and particularized injury that is actual or imminent” or
“certainly impending,”192 they will not be able to state a claim that at some
point in the data chain someone had at least a reasonable duty of care
specific to the plaintiff and breached that duty, or even to argue the UAS
operator produced a data product and should be liable under the
MacPherson products liability rule.
For the hundreds of thousands of data breach victims193 who cannot
meet both the standing requirements and articulate a special duty of care,
there is no remedy under current law. Neither the existing federal statutes
governing data nor the Electronic Communications Privacy Act nor the
common law provide an effective remedy to people whose data has been
compromised.
From the perspective of UAS operators who, by virtue of their
employment or business activities, are actively engaged in gathering data
that has great value for both legitimate users and for hackers and digital
miscreants, that same lack of remedy provides a welcome liability shield
for liability beyond two links in the data chain: (1) the UAS operation and
(2) in flight data collection. It appears UAS operators are also effectively
shielded from liability for data breaches in the final two links in the data
chain: (3) post-flight data processing, and (4) data use, dissemination, and
storage.

192. See supra notes 169–72 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 175.
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